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EXTREME SPORTS AND EXTREME LIABILITY: THE
EFFECT OF WAIVERS OF LIABILITY
IN EXTREME SPORTS
Amanda Greer
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a skier in a base jumping competition is about ready to
jump off a cliff. Once the skier jumps off the cliff, usually the bindings
of the skis will come off and the parachute will open, enabling a safe
landing. However, in this situation, the bindings of the skis come off,
but the parachute fails to open. The skier subsequently crashes to the
ground, sustaining extremely serious injuries that leave the skier para-
lyzed. As a result of the injuries, the skier files an action against the
sponsors' involved in putting on the competition, claiming that they
were negligent in giving him a defective parachute. The sponsors as-
sert that the skier signed a liability waiver barring all claims, even
negligence.
The scenario above is one that presents several problems. For ex-
ample, does signing a waiver of liability bar a claim of negligence
against the sponsor of a sporting event? Does a skier involved in base
jumping assume the risk of a parachute not opening? Does the spon-
sor have a duty to not increase those risks already inherent in the
nature of the sport of base jumping? These are just a few questions
that would be asked to see determine whether the skier could recover
for the sustained injuries.
The sport of snowboarding, like the example of base jumping
above, is known as an extreme sport.2 A sport is defined as an activity
that is done for enjoyment or thrill, which requires physical exertion,
elements of skill, and involves a potential risk of injury. An extreme
sport, on the other hand, is classified as being physically hazardous,
featuring a combination of speed, height, danger, spectacular stunts,
1. Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/sponsor?
show=0&t=1320940281 (last visited Nov. 10, 2011). A sponsor is defined as a person or organi-
zation that pays for or plans and carries out a project or activity. The term "sponsor" will be
used throughout this paper to refer to organizations and promoters of a sporting event.
2. Matt Williamson, The History of Extreme Sports (2007), http://www.catalogs.com/info/
sports/history-of-extreme-sports.html.
3. Truong v. Nguyen, 156 Cal. App. 4th 865, 880 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
81
82 DEPAUL I. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 9:81
and varying weather conditions.4 Athletes who participate in extreme
sports exceed traditional safety limitations to create new disciplines in
the sportf For example, individuals who engage in extreme skiing
make dangerous runs down mountains over uncharted terrain.6 The
enhanced danger posed by cliffs, crevasses, and extremely steep slopes
is what elevates traditional snow skiing to an extreme level.7 Some
popular sports that have become extreme sports as a result of their
extreme elements are extreme skiing, snowboarding, mountain biking,
inline skating, and white-water kayaking.8 Other extreme sports in-
clude wakeboarding, street luge, skateboarding, and freestyle biking
events.9 Snowboarding, skateboarding, and freestyle biking are per-
formed on ramps, inclines, or in a half-pipe, some with walls as high as
fifty feet.10
The fear that drives many people away from the risks of extreme
sports may be the same ingredient that keeps others coming back for
more.'1 By feeling a lack of danger in everyday activities, people may
feel compelled to seek out danger or risk. 12 Thus, during the last dec-
ade, participation in extreme sports has soared.13 While participation
in team sports declined by a quarter in the last decade, the number of
teenagers who skateboard, snowboard, or inline skate increased more
than five times.1 4 Many of these extreme sports were made popular
by the X Games, which has become known as the Olympics of ex-
treme sports competitions on ESPN. 15 The X Games are comprised
of the Winter X Games, which are held in January or February, and
4. World English Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/extreme+sport (last vis-
ited Sept. 19, 2011).
5. Williamson, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Free Online Encyclopedia, http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/extreme+sports (last
visited Sept. 19, 2011).
10. Id.
11. Brian Handwerk, National Geographic New, Fear Factor: Success and Risk in Extreme
Sports, (July 9, 2004), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/07/0709 040709 science
risk.html.
12. Williamson, supra note 2.
13. David Hornton, Extreme Sports and Assumption of Risk: A Blueprint, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev.
599, 602 (2004). Such sports include skydiving, bungee jumping, rock climbing, hang-gliding,
motocross, BMX, snowboarding, wake-boarding, kite-boarding, and skateboarding.
14. Id. at 603.
15. Kate Pickert, A Brief History of the X Games (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/
nation/article/0,8599,1873166,00.html.
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the Summer X Games, which are usually held in August. 16 The Win-
ter X Games is the leading winter action sports competition and is
compiled of the greatest winter action sport athletes from around the
world.17 Winter sports in the X Games include skiing, snowboarding,
snowmobiling, snow skating, and ice climbing.18 Summer sports in the
X Games include freestyle BMX, motocross, skateboarding, surfing,
bungee jumping, water sports, inline skating, street luge, sky surfing,
and sport climbing.19 The X Games have become so popular that
about fifteen big-name sponsors have bought advertising packages re-
portedly worth between $1.5 million and $3 million.20 It has also been
reported that the X Games will expand to six action sports competi-
tions annually: two in the United States and four internationally, be-
ginning in 2013.21 The 1998 and 2002 Olympics also began to feature
extreme snowboarding events in a half-pipe, in which snowboarders
performed jumps, rotations, and mid-air maneuvers.22
Extreme Sports, by their nature, are inherently dangerous.23 The
risk of injury is extremely high.24 This poses a problem for sponsors of
an event because they will want to protect themselves from a lawsuit
that may arise from an athlete's injury. In many liability waivers, ath-
letes assume all risks involved in the sport, even the sponsors own
negligence. The purpose of this article is to explain why it is against
public policy for sponsors of an event to be allowed to contract away
their own negligence in extreme sports. Athletes already assume the
risks inherent in the sport, but they should not be expected to assume
a risk above those inherent in the sport and suffer an injury that has
been the result of a sponsor's negligence. A sponsor, on the other
hand, should not be responsible for an athlete's injury that results
from a risk inherent in the sport. Therefore, this article proposes a
modification of liability waivers to remove the term "negligence" and
include a form of comparative fault, where the athlete and the sponsor
16. Webster's Online Dictionary, http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definitions/X+
GAMES?cx-partner-pub-0939450753529744%3AvOqd0l-tdlq&cof=FORID%3A9&ie=UJTF-8
&qX+GAMES&sa=Search#906 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Mike Bresnahan, X Games Become Extremely Popular The Sun Sentinel, (Aug. 13, 2003),
available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2003-08-13/news/0308130139-1-x-games-skateboard-
ers-nba-finals.
21. Matt Higgins, X Games to Expand to Six International Events in 2013 ESPN, (May 13,
2011), http://xgames.espn.go.com/article/6553598/x-games-expand-six-international-events-be-
ginning-2013.
22. Free Online Encyclopedia, supra note 9.
23. Williamson, supra note 2.
24. World English Dictionary, supra note 4.
83
84 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 9:81
will share different percentages of fault if an injury were to occur as a
result of the sponsor's negligence.
Part I of the article reviews liability waivers in extreme sports and
the laws in various states regarding liability waivers. Part II explores
the doctrine of assumption of risk. This section will review primary
and secondary assumption of risk. Additionally, this section will also
discuss the inherent risks involved in extreme sports and the duty
owed by the sponsor to the athlete. Part III calls for possible solutions
to the problem of liability waivers allowing sponsors to be exempt
from their own acts of negligence. This section will propose that legis-
lative action should be taken to enact statutes that address the inher-
ent risks involved in each extreme sport. Another solution involves
recommending that courts, when determining whether a liability
waiver is valid against an athlete after the athlete has sustained an
injury, conduct an assumption of risk analysis. The article concludes
with a proposal to change the language used in extreme sports liability
waivers.
I. LIABILITY WAIVERS IN EXTREME SPORTS
Extreme sports have a high risk of injury, possibly even death. Ath-
letes, however, still pursue these types of sports. In order for the ath-
lete to pursue this sport, someone must sponsor and organize the
event. In putting on the event, the sponsor will want to make sure
that in the unfortunate event that an athlete sustains an injury, the
sponsor will be insulated from any and all liability. Therefore, the
sponsor will likely create a liability waiver that the athlete will sign
before competing in the event. In many of these waivers, also known
as express assumption of risk, the defendant owes no duty to protect
the plaintiff from a known risk because the plaintiff, in advance, has
given his express consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of
conduct toward him.25 The result is that the defendant is relieved of
any legal duty to the plaintiff; and being under no duty, the defendant
cannot be charged with negligence. 26
A. An Example of a Liability Waiver
The contract below, from the International Free Skiers Association
[Hereinafter, "IFSA"], shows the exact language that a sponsor has
used to exempt him or herself from all liability:
25. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 703 (Cal. 1992).
26. Id.
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INTERNATIONAL FREE SKIERS ASSOCIATION EVENTS
PLEASE READ CAREFULLY BEFORE PRESSING
THE AGREE BUTTON.
THIS IS A RELEASE OF LIABILITY AND WAIVER OF
CERTAIN LEGAL RIGHTS.
1. Being at least 18 years old or has signed release by Parent or guard-
ian for ages 12-17 (hereinafter referred to collectively as
"Competitor").
2. Competitor warrants and represents that he/she is in good health
and there are no special problems associated with the care of the
Competitor and the undersigned parent or guardian (if applicable) has
left no special instructions regarding the Competitor.
3. Competitor accepts and understands that alpine skiing in its various
forms is a HAZARDOUS sport that has many dangers and risks. It is
further understood that training or racing competitively is more HAZ-
ARDOUS than recreational skiing. Competitor realizes that injuries
are common and ordinary occurrence of this sport. Competitor agrees
as a condition of being allowed to compete in an IFSA sanctioned
event and use the ski area facility and premises, that Competitor
freely accepts and voluntarily ASSUMES ALL RISKS OF PER-
SONAL INJURY OR DEATH or for property damage which results
in any way from negligence, conditions on or about the premises and
facilities, the operation of the event including, but not limited to,
grooming, snow making, ski lift operations, actions or omissions of
employees or Board of Directors of the International Free Skiers As-
sociation or Competitor's participation in skiing, training, any compet-
itive event, or other activities at the event.
Competitor agrees with the premise that Competitor is a competitor
at all times, whether practicing for competition or in competition.
Competitor agrees that he/she is always provided an opportunity to
conduct a reasonable visual inspection of the training race course.
Competitor understands that he/she will be held to assume the risk of
all course conditions, course construction, or layout and obstacles.
WARNING
A skier assumes the risk of any injury to person or property resulting
from any of the inherent dangers and risks of skiing and may not re-
cover from any International Free Skiers Association employee or Di-
rector for any injury resulting from any of the inherent dangers and
risks of skiing including: Changing weather conditions; existing and
changing snow conditions; bare spots; rocks; stumps; trees; collisions
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with natural objects, man-made objects, or other skiers; variations in
terrain; and the failure of skiers to ski within their own abilities.
4. Competitors hereby assumes all risks which may be associated with
and/or result from his/her involvement in such Activity and releases
and indemnifies International Free Skiers Association (IFSA), its sub-
sidiaries and affiliates, their respective officers, directors, agents, ser-
vants, and employees (hereinafter International Free Skiers
Association (IFSA)), of and from any liability, claims, demands, ac-
tions and causes of action whatsoever arising out of or related to any
loss, damage or injury, including death, that may be sustained by me
while participating in the Activity, including, but not limited to, those
injuries and damages caused by the negligence and or breach of war-
ranty, express or implied, on the part of International Free Skiers As-
sociation (IFSA).
5. By execution of this release International Free Skiers Association
(IFSA) shall be indemnified for any injury to other person(s) or prop-
erty which Competitor may cause as a result of engaging in the
Activity.
6. Competitor authorizes International Free Skiers Association
(IFSA) and/or its authorized personnel to call for medical care for
him/her or to transport him/her to a medical facility or hospital if, in
the opinion of such personnel, medical attention is needed for him/
her. Competitor agrees that upon his/her transport to any such medi-
cal facility or hospital that International Free Skiers Association
(IFSA) shall not have any further responsibility for him/her. Further,
Competitor agrees to pay all costs associated with such medical care
and related transportation provided for him/her and shall indemnify
and hold harmless International Free Skiers Association (IFSA) of
and from any costs incurred therein.
7. COMPETITOR CONTRACTUALLY AGREES that any and
ALL DISPUTES between himself/herself and International Free Ski-
ers Association (IFSA) arising from his/her use of equipment and/or
participation in the Activity OR use of this equipment, and INCLUD-
ING and claims for personal injury and/or death, WILL BE GOV-
ERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA and
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION thereof will be in the state of court
residing in the county where the alleged tort occurred or the federal
courts of the state of California.
8. IN THE EVENT ANY SECTION OF THIS RELEASE IS
FOUND TO BE UNENFORCEABLE, THE REMAINING
TERMS SHALL BE FULLY ENFORCEABLE..
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9. This release shall be binding upon Competitor's assignees, subro-
gors, distributees, heirs, next of kin, executors, personal representa-
tives, and administrators and may be pled by International Free Skiers
Association (IFSA) as a complete bar and defense against any claim,
demand, action or causes of action by or on behalf of the Competitor.
I HAVE CAREFULLY READ THE FORGOING LIABILITY RE-
LEASE, UNDERSTAND ITS CONTENTS AND CLICK AGREE
WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE. 2 7
The contract above poses several problems for the competitors.
Most notably, the IFSA will not be responsible for any acts of their
own negligence. The IFSA stated that they would not be responsible
for any property damage or injury to the athlete, even if it resulted
from their own negligence. 2 8 An athlete that signs this is agreeing that
if he or she receives an injury as a result of IFSA's negligence, IFSA
will not be liable for any damages. As a result of this, an athlete could
be left with thousands of dollars in medical bills and extreme pain and
suffering. An athlete may still try to bring claims against associations
such as IFSA, asserting that the liability waiver should not be valid.
Courts, however, have been split on whether liability waivers should
be valid or void as against public policy.
B. A View of Liability Waivers from Various State Courts
1. Banfield v. Louis2 9
Susan Banfield, before competing in a triathlon in Ft. Lauderdale,
Florida, signed a "release" or "waiver" relieving the race sponsors,
organizers, and promoters of any and all liability.30 While Banfield
was riding her bicycle on the designated bicycle race course on the day
of the event, she was struck and seriously injured by a motor vehicle
operated by Louis.3 1 Banfield subsequently filed suit against the
event sponsors, alleging that they breached their duty to Banfield by
failing to maintain a safe bicycle course. 32 The court began its analysis
by stating that in Florida, waiver clauses are not looked upon with
favor, but will be valid and enforceable if the intent to relieve a party
of its own negligence is clear and unequivocal.33 The court reasoned
27. E-mail from Chris Tatsuno, Member, Int. Free Skiers Assoc., copy of JFSA Release of
Liability and Waiver (Sept. 26, 2011, 09:02 EST) (on file with author).
28. Id.
29. Banfield v. Louis, 589 So. 2d 441 (Fla. . Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
30. Id. at 443.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 444.
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that when Banfield signed the waiver, she knew that she was releasing
all of the sponsors and promoters, as well as their agents, from liabil-
ity.34 Additionally, the court held that although Banfield expressed
legitimate public safety concerns, "it was a matter of great public con-
cern that freedom of contract not be interfered with."13
2. Dare v. Freefall Adventures, Inc. 3 6
Joseph Dare was injured in a sky diving accident when he attempted
to avoid colliding with Eric Johnson, a co-participant in the jump.3 7
Prior to jumping, Dare released Freefall Adventures from any claims
of injuries arising from Freefall's negligence.38 In New Jersey, dis-
claimers or limitations of liability are generally not favored.3 9 The
court, before its analysis, discussed how they had never addressed re-
lease/waiver agreements in the context of skydiving, but had done so
in the context of skiing.40 In the context of skiing, a release from liabil-
ity for injuries arising from the activity may be void as public policy
because of its adhesive nature, and, furthermore, because the release
cannot relieve the owner of the ski resort from its statutory duty of
care. 41 The court in this case ruled that the operator did not breach its
duty of care in how the facility was run, nor did the operator materi-
ally increase the risk of injury to the skydiver beyond those reasonably
anticipated by skydiving participants. 4 2 The operator, therefore, was
not liable. 43
3. Klem v. Chaplinsky44
Thomas Klem was injured after participating in a deck hockey game
at the Sports Arena. 4 5 The Sports Arena argued that Klem was
barred from bringing a negligence claim against them, because he had
signed a liability waiver. 46 In Connecticut, courts do not favor con-
34. Id. at 445.
35. Id. at 446.
36. Dare v. Freefall Adventures, Inc., 793 A.2d 125 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
37. Id. at 128.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 134.
40. Id. at 135.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 133.
43. Id.
44. Klem v. Chaplinsky, No. CV010511065, 2002 WL 31991911 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 23,
2002).
45. Id. at 1.
46. Id.
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tract provisions that relieve a person from his own negligence. 47 Such
provisions have been upheld, however, when both parties have as-
sented to the terms of the waiver. 4 8 The majority of trial courts in
Connecticut also take the position that specific language, i.e., the word
''negligence" must be present in negligence waivers to effectively
waive claims for negligence against facility operators. 49 In Klem, the
court found the waiver not to be valid because the waiver did not
contain the appropriate language to sufficiently absolve the Sports
Arena of liability for its own negligence.50
4. Gregorie v. Alpine Meadows Ski Corp.5'
Jessica Gregorie was snowboarding in California. 52 While on the
mountain, Gregorie began to hike a traverse.53 While hiking, she
slipped due to the icy condition of the snow and slid over a rock.54
Gregorie subsequently died. 5 In California, liability waivers will be
found to be sufficient as long as the release constitutes a clear and
unequivocal waiver with specific reference to a defendant's negli-
gence.56 The scope of the waiver must also be clear.57 An act of negli-
gence is reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the
release was given if it is included within the express scope of the re-
lease.58 In the current case, the release stated that Gregorie agreed to
release Alpine Meadows from liability for any damages, injury, or
death arising from her participation in the sport of skiing, including
the alleged negligence of Alpine Meadows.59 The court found that the
release was clear and unambiguous, and it served as sufficient notifica-
tion to Gregorie was he was giving up any future claim against Alpine
Meadows for negligence. 6 0 Therefore, the court found the release to
be a valid and enforceable waiver of liability.61
47. Id. at 6.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 7.
50. Id. at 11.
51. Gregorie v. Alpine Meadows Ski Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69237 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
52. Id. at 4.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 52.
57. Id. at 55.
58. Id. at 56.
59. Id. at 57.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 59.
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C. Waivers of Liability in High Risk Sports
The cases above discussed various state courts and their laws re-
garding liability waivers. However, international courts also have
their own laws with regards to waivers and releases of liability. Specif-
ically, Ontario, Canada has implemented a three staged analysis to
determine whether a waiver of liability is valid and enforceable in high
risk sports. The analysis is as follows:
Is the release valid in the sense that the plaintiff knew what he or
she was signing?
What is the scope of the release and is it worded broadly enough to
cover the conduct of the defendant?
Should the release not be enforced because it is unconscionable? 6 2
The first part of the analysis focuses on whether the plaintiff signed
the release with the knowledge that it was a legal document affecting
his or her rights. 63 If the defendant can establish this element, the
release will be valid, regardless of whether the plaintiff read and un-
derstood the document prior to its execution. 64 The second part of
the analysis requires the court to interpret the clause as to whether or
not it operates to exonerate the defendant from liability. 65 The release
should explain the particular types of negligence that it intends to ex-
clude. 66 If the court finds the release to be broad enough to exonerate
the defendant from all liability, including negligence, then it will likely
find the clause to be valid as well. 67 The third part of the analysis
focuses on whether the release should not be enforced because it is
unconscionable. 68 A release will be found unconscionable, and there-
fore unenforceable, where it sufficiently diverges from community
standards of fairness and morality.69 A release will not diverge from
community standards of fairness and morality where it can be shown
that the plaintiff knew of the inherent risks associated with the sport.70
After looking at cases from the United States and Canada, it can be
concluded that courts do not look upon liability waivers favorably, but
62. Peter Cronyn & Jessica Fullerton, Waivers of Liability in High Risk Sports: A Review of
Isildar v. Kanata Diving Supply, 28th Annual Civil Litigation Conference (Nov. 28, 2008), p. 3,
available at http://www.nelligan.ca/publications/e/Waivers-ofLiability-inHighRiskSports1.
pdf
63. Id. at 4.
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id. at 9.
66. Id. at 14.
67. Id. at 10.
68. Id. at 3.
69. Id. at 11.
70. Id. at 12.
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will be found to be valid if particular criterion are fulfilled. Both Ca-
nadian and United States court systems have held that the scope of
the waiver must be broad enough to include each defendant and each
defendant's potential liability, including the act of negligence.71 The
plaintiff must also know what he or she is signing and must assent to
the terms of the waiver.72 If these factors are met, a court will likely
the waiver to be valid and an athlete may not be able to bring an
action for negligence against the sponsor. However, a finding of valid-
ity of a waiver should not end the court's analysis. Recovery for an
injured individual should not be barred, simply because the individual
is aware that an activity involves a risk of harm that may arise from
another's negligence and then voluntarily proceeds to participate in
that activity. Participating in a potentially dangerous sport does not
mean that an athlete consents to a breach of duty by others that in-
creases the risks posed by the sport itself.Therefore, it is important to
determine the inherent risks of the sport and whether the sponsor
owes a duty to the participants under the doctrine of assumption of
risk.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The traditional doctrine of assumption of risk involves a plaintiff
who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or
reckless conduct of the defendant.73 The plaintiff subsequently cannot
recover for such harm arising from the defendant's conduct.74 There-
fore, assumption of risk operates as a complete defense against all lia-
bility, negligent conduct as well as reckless conduct.79 The traditional
doctrine of assumption of risk became problematic, however, when
most jurisdictions recognized that it was no longer defensible to com-
pletely bar recovery to a plaintiff who voluntarily assumed a risk of
harm.76 Assumption of risk is now divided into two separate forms:
primary assumption of risk and secondary assumption of risk.
A. Primary Assumption of Risk
Within the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, the defendant
owes no duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk of harm.77
71. See id. at 14; see also Gregorie, supra note 51, at 56; see also Klem, supra note 44, at 7.
72. See Cronyn, supra note 62, at 4; see also Klem, supra note 44, at 6.
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Hornton, supra note 13, at 611.
77. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 697, 704 (Cal. 1992).
91
92 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 9:81
However, defendants do owe a duty to not increase those risks inher-
ent in the sport.78 If there is no duty of care owed (i.e. the defendant
does not increase those risks inherent in the sport), the plaintiff's as-
sumption of the risk acts as a complete bar to the plaintiff's cause of
action.79 The doctrine bars liability because the plaintiff is said to
have assumed the particular risks inherent in a sport by choosing to
participate in said sport.80 Thus, a court must evaluate the fundamen-
tal nature of the sport and the defendant's role in or relationship to
that sport in order to determine whether the defendant owes a duty to
protect a plaintiff from a particular risk of harm.81 A duty analysis
under primary assumption of risk also turns on the question of
whether a given injury is within the "inherent" risk of the sport, which
can only be determined by looking at a particular sport and how it is
played. 8 2
An activity falls within primary assumption of risk if the activity is
done for enjoyment or thrill, requires physical exertion as well as ele-
ments of skill, and involves a challenge containing a physical risk of
injury.8 3 For example, Morgan v. New York is a case where primary
assumption of risk barred the plaintiff's claim against the defendant
for injuries that the plaintiff sustained.8 4 In Morgan, Sean Morgan
was injured during a competition while driving a two-person bob-
sled.85 Morgan commenced a negligence action against the State of
New York, alleging defective design of the bobsled run.8 6 The court
stated that it was the duty of the State "'to make the [bobsled run] as
[it] appeared to be and if the risks of the activity were fully compre-
hended or perfectly obvious, plaintiff [must be found to have] consent
to them and defendant [to have] performed its duty' ".87 The court
held that Morgan fully comprehended the risks presented by the dan-
gerous nature of bobsledding, which included the way that the bobsled
run was constructed. Therefore, the court found no breach of duty by
the State of New York.88
78. Id. at 709.
79. O'Donoghue v. Bear Mountain Ski Resort, 30 Cal. App. 4th 188, 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
80. Truong v. Nguyen, 156 Cal. App. 4th 865, 876-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
81. Id.
82. Staten v. Super. Ct. of Alameda Cnty., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1628, 1635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
83. Calhoon v. Lewis, 81 Cal. App. 4th 108, 115 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
84. Morgan v. . New York, 645 N.Y.S.2d 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 616, (quoting Giordano v. Shanty Hallowed Corp., 209 A.D.2d 760, 760 (N.Y. App.
Div.3d Dept.).
87. Id. at 617.
88. Id.
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1. Inherent Risks involved in a Sport
In the sports setting, conditions or conduct that otherwise might be
viewed as dangerous often are an integral part of the sport itself.89 In
the sport of freestyle skiing, moguls pose a risk of harm to skiers that
might not exist were the moguls removed.90 However, the challenge
and risks posed by the moguls are part of the sport of skiing, and a
sponsor of an event has no duty to eliminate them.91 When doing an
analysis under primary assumption of risk, it is important to look at
the inherent risks involved in a particular sport. Not only do sponsors
of the activity have a duty to sports participants to not increase the
inherent risks of a sport, but the sports participants should also be
aware of what those inherent risks are so that they are adequately
informed as to what types of injuries a sponsor should not be liable
for.92
To determine a sport's inherent risks, a judge should consider if
eliminating the risk would (1) chill vigorous participation in the sport
and (2) alter the fundamental nature of the activity.93 For example, if
operators of ski resorts were required to eliminate the danger of fall-
ing in difficult terrain, the prospect of liability would effectively termi-
nate the business of a ski resort operation. 9 4 California courts have
also held that in regards to skiing and snowboarding, there are certain
inherent risks that the sponsor of an event has no duty to eliminate or
mitigate.99 These risks include: moguls on a ski run, trees bordering a
ski run, snow-covered stumps, variations in terrain, changes in surface
or subsurface snow conditions, bare spots, other skiers, and snow-
making equipment. 96 Whether a skier personally saw the hazard is
irrelevant to the issue of whether the risk is one inherent in the sport
of skiing.97
89. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 697, 708 (Cal. 1992).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Gregorie v. Alpine Meadows Ski Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69237, at 23 (E.D. Cal.
2009).
93. Sanchez v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 104 Cal. App. 4th 703, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
94. Gregorie, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 29.
95. Id. at 24-25.
96. O'Donoghue v. Bear Mountain Ski Resort, 30 Cal. App. 4th 188, 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
97. Id.
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B. Inherent Risk Statutes
Sport safety statutes exist in most states to protect sport and recrea-
tion providers from liability.98 These statutes place responsibility on
participants for voluntarily assuming the inherent risks in a particular
sport.99 The most common types of sport safety statutes provide legis-
lative protection for activities such as snow skiing, snowboarding,
roller skating, equestrian activities, hang gliding, snowmobiling, and
whitewater boating.100 Defining inherent risks has become a key as-
pect of many sport specific legislative initiatives.101 However, few in-
herent risk statutes address extreme sports.1 0 2
The justification for providing legislative protection for sport activi-
ties is primarily economic.103 Sport safety statutes are designed with a
focus on maintaining a balance between economics and athlete
safety. 1 0 4 For example, skiing is a popular activity in many states that
have the right combination of terrain and weather conditions for ski-
ing.10 Ski resorts draw visitors from many different states, which
often has a positive economic impact on the regional and state econo-
mies.10 6 Therefore, the purpose of legislative initiatives is to decrease
the costs associated with litigation and to keep ski operators in
business. 107
States vary as to what inherent risks an athlete assumes when par-
ticipating in a specific sport.108 For example, twenty-six states have
statutory provisions that address the inherent risks that participants
assume when skiing.'09 For the states that have statutes that fail to list
the inherent risks, the statutes are open for interpretation of what
constitutes an inherent risk. 110 Vermont, for example, states that in-
herent risks are those which are "obvious and necessary."' Forty-
one states have statutory provisions that address the inherent risks
98. John 0. Spengler & Brian P. Burket, Sport Safety Statutes and Inherent Risk: A Compari-
son Study of Sport Specific Legislation, 11 J. Legal Aspects of Sport 135 (2001).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Hornton, supra note 13, at 619.
103. Spengler, supra note 98, at 135.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. The states that list inherent risks are: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Ore-
gon, Tennessee, and Utah.
110. Spengler, supra note 98, at 135.
111. Id.
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participants assume when riding horses, and eleven states have statu-
tory provisions that address the inherent risks participants assume
when roller-skating. 1 1 2 There is little uniformity, however, in the
states that have statutes addressing the inherent risks associated with
skiing, roller-skating, and equestrian activities. 113
The following case of Collins v. Schweitzer, Inc. showcases the effect
of an Idaho sport safety statute regarding the inherent risks involved
in the sport of skiing. 1 1 4 In Collins, Michael Collins was competing in
a ski race on Schweitzer Mountain, which located in Northern
Idaho.11 s During the race, Collins was skiing alongside another
racer. 116 In an attempt to avoid the other racer after they had passed
the finish line, Collins lost control, slid through some netting, and col-
lided further down the hill with a lift tower that was in the vicinity of
the racecourse.117 The lift tower was padded, but the padding did not
prevent Collins from breaking his neck in the collision. 118 Collins
claimed that the resort and ski race sponsor were negligent when they
designed the racecourse so close to the lift tower.119 The Idaho stat-
ute, lists injuries caused by lift towers as an inherent risk that is as-
sumed by the skiers. 12 0 Given the language of the statute, paired with
a finding that the risk of colliding with the lift tower was not increased
by Schweitzer's placement of the racecourse, the court held in favor of
Schweitzer Ski Resort. 121
Although the Collins case demonstrates how a sport safety statute
can bar relief to an injured athlete, there may be circumstances where
a sport safety statute can allow recovery. For example, as a
snowboarder is snowboarding down a run, he sees a mound of snow
on the side of the run that looks like a jump. The snowboarder goes
over to the mound of snow and jumps off of it, subsequently suffering
an injury. The snowboarder brings an action against the ski resort for
negligently maintaining the mountain by not removing the mound of
snow. The state that this incident took place in has a sport safety stat-
ute, but the statute states that the inherent risks involved with
snowboarding are those that are obvious and necessary. A court may
112. Id. at 161-63.
113. Id. at 164.
114. Collins v. Schweitzer, Inc., 21 F.3d 1491 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
115. Id. at 1492.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1493.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1495.
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decide that a mound of snow on the side of a run is a risk that is not
obvious and necessary in the sport of snowboarding. If the statute was
specific as to what the inherent risks were, there would be no question
as to whether a mound of snow on a ski run is considered an inherent
risk. Therefore, defining what the inherent risks are in a particular
sport is vital to a court's analysis of primary assumption of risk as well
as secondary assumption of risk.
B. Secondary Assumption of Risk
Secondary assumption of risk applies when the risk that causes the
plaintiff's injuries was caused by actions of the defendant which in-
creased an inherent risk of the sport.1 2 2 The defendant has breached
the duty of care owed to the plaintiff through the increasing of an
inherent risk. 123 The breach of duty occurs when the defendant in-
creases the risk of injury beyond that inherent in the sport, not when
the defendant's conduct may have increased the severity of the injury
suffered. 1 2 4 Imposing liability on these defendants for increasing the
risks of a sport is justified because they are in control of the conditions
under which the plaintiff engages in the sport.125 However, this policy
justification does not extend to a defendant who is wholly uninvolved
with and unconnected to the sport.126
Under secondary assumption of risk, the defendant is not entitled to
be relieved of liability for an injury proximately caused by such breach
of duty.127 The plaintiff will also share the fault for his or her in-
jury.128 Even though the plaintiff will share the fault, the plaintiff's
voluntary decision to face the risk inherent in a sport does not operate
as a complete bar to recovery, but rather functions as a form of com-
parative fault. 1 2 9 Under comparative fault, the responsibility of both
parties is relevant because an injury has been caused by both a defen-
dant's breach of a legal duty to the plaintiff and the plaintiff's volun-
tary decision to engage in an unusually risky sport.130 Application of
comparative fault will not relieve either individual of responsibility for
his or her actions but rather will ensure that neither party will escape
122. O'Donoghue v. Bear Mountain Ski Resort, 30 Cal. App. 4th 188, 192 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994).
123. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 697, 704 (Cal. 1992).
124. Calhoon v. Lewis, 81 Cal. App. 4th 108, 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
125. Id. at 117.
126. Id.
127. Knight, 834 P.2d at 704.
128. Rosencrans v. Dover Images, Ltd., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1072, 1083 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
129. Truong v. Nguyen, 156 Cal. App. 4th 865, 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
130. Knight, 834 P.2d at 707-08.
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such responsibility.131 Therefore, damages under secondary assump-
tion of risk will be apportioned between the parties. 1 3 2
An example of a case that portrays secondary assumption of risk is
Rosencrans v. Dover Images, Ltd. Under Rosencrans, Jerid Rosen-
crans, while practicing before a motocross competition, went up a
ramp for a jump and fell on the downslope of the ramp, which placed
him outside the view of the other riders.133 Fifty seconds later, two
motorcyclists struck Rosencrans, causing him to sustain serious inju-
ries. 13 4 There was at least one caution flagger at the track when Ro-
sencrans fell. However, at the time of the fall, the caution flagger was
not on the platform near the location where Rosencrans fell.1 The
court stated that even though jumps and falls are inherent risks in
motocross competitions, an owner and operator of a track has a duty
not to increase those inherent risks and to provide a warning system,
such as caution flaggers, to alert other riders of a fallen participant on
the track. 136 Therefore, because a caution flagger was not near the
location where Rosencrans fell, Dover Images breached the duty it
owed to Rosencrans. 13 7
1. Duty
It has been established that defendants generally have no legal duty
to eliminate risks inherent in the sport itself, but do have a duty to not
increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the
sport.138 This duty requires an owner or operator to minimize the
risks without altering the nature of the sport.13 9 As a matter of public
policy, a duty of care should not apply when compliance with the duty
would require that an integral part of the sport be abandoned or
would discourage vigorous participation in sporting events. 1 4 0 For ex-
ample, taking moguls out of the sport of skiing or jumps out of the
sport of motocross would probably discourage participation in those
sports. In the sport of motocross, jumps and falls are inherent to the
sport. 141 Therefore, there is no duty to eliminate the jumps entirely,
131. Id. at 707.
132. Rosencrans, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1083.
133. Id. at 1077.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1084.
137. Id.
138. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 697, 708 (Cal. 1992).
139. Rosencrans, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1084.
140. Truong v. Nguyen, 156 Cal. App. 4th 865, 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
141. Branco v. Kearny Moto Park, Inc., 37 Cal. App. 4th 184, 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
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and there is no duty to protect against injuries that arise from reasona-
bly designed jumps. 142 However, the sport does not require jumps to
be designed in such a way as to create an extreme risk of injury. 143
A case that exemplifies the principle above is Branco v. Kearny
Moto Park, Inc. In Branco, Brandon Branco was racing his bicycle on
Kearny Moto Parks [Hereinafter, "KMP"] BMX course when his bi-
cycle crashed and struck the side wall of an expert caliber jump's land-
ing area.1 4 4 Branco suffered a broken neck, which resulted in
permanent quadriplegia. 14 5 As a result, Branco brought an action, al-
leging that KMP's expert caliber jump was negligently designed be-
cause the design increased the inherent risks involved in the sport of
BMX.146 The court stated that commercial operators of sports facili-
ties owe a duty to their patrons to ensure that the facilities and related
services do not increase the risk of injury above the level inherent in
the sport.1 4 7 Branco provided an expert witness that testified that the
first hill of the jump was too steep, and such design puts the rider at an
extreme risk because the rider is subsequently in an extremely unbal-
anced position. 148 The expert also testified that the distance between
the two hills of the jump is so great that the rider has to be moving at a
very high rate of speed to make the second jump.149 Finally, the ex-
pert concluded that both of these factors tend to put riders at a risk
because they put the rider at the very end of their ability. 150 The court
was persuaded and held that there was a triable issue of fact regarding
whether KMP's jump was negligently designed.19 1
Even though there is a duty owed to a bicycle racer injured on a
bicycle jump which by its design creates an extreme risk of injury,
there is no duty owed to a skier injured on a mogul. 152 There is a
distinction between the degrees of control exercised over the creation
of nature-made obstacles involved in the sport of skiing and man-
made obstacles in the sport of motocross.153 However, even if there is
no duty owed to skiers who ski over a mogul, there could be a duty
owed to skiers who perform tricks over a jump that is man-made. For
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 187.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 186.
147. Id. at 191.
148. Id. at 188.
149. Id. at 188-89.
150. Id. at 189.
151. Id. at 186.
152. Id. at 193.
153. Id.
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example, if the sponsors of a skiing/snowboarding event construct
jumps within the racecourse and make those jumps mandatory (if the
athlete misses the jump, the athlete would become disqualified), a
duty could be imposed if the jumps were designed in a way that cre-
ates an extreme risk of injury above and beyond what was already
considered an inherent risk in the sport. A skier/snowboarder already
assumes the inherent risk that man-made jumps create (the possibility
of falling and sustaining an injury), but a skier/snowboarder should
not have to assume the risk that the jump was designed in a way that
makes the likelihood of an injury more severe. Therefore, a sponsor
of a sporting event will have a duty to provide a reasonably safe
course or track. 154
Applying a duty standard to extreme sports is practical if an athlete
wishes to recover for injuries that he or she sustained. If duty was not
an issue, sponsors could provide an activity and avoid liability for inju-
ries that could be foreseeable as a result of their negligence. Courts,
however, have struggled to apply the duty not to negligently increase
the inherent risks involved in extreme sports because it is arguably
difficult to define what constitutes "negligence" when injuries in such
sports are a common occurrence. 1 55 It has also been argued that neg-
ligence liability for sports related injuries would curtail both participa-
tion and the vigorous and active play that is essential to some sporting
events.156 For example, a California court has found that "[t]he over-
riding consideration in the application of primary assumption of risk is
to avoid imposing a duty which might chill vigorous participation in
the implicated activity and thereby alter its fundamental nature."1 5 7
In Regents of University of California v Superior Court, Norman
Roettgen fell and subsequently died during a rock climbing class. 58
The complaint alleged that the fall was the result of the Regents' neg-
ligence in placing four rope anchors into a single crack system.159 The
court, however, noted that "falling, whether because of one's own slip,
a co-climber's stumble, or an anchor system giving way, is the very
risk inherent in the sport of mountain climbing and cannot be com-
pletely eliminated without destroying the sport itself."160 Without
considering whether the Regents had increased the sport's inherent
risks by misplacing the rope anchors, the court held that the risk of
154. Rosencrans v. Dover Images, Ltd., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1072, 1084 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
155. See Hornton, supra note 13, at 656.
156. Cahill v. Carella, 648 A.2d 169, 172 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994).
157. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Super. Ct., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1040, 1046 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
158. Id. at 1042.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1047.
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falling from the rock-face is inherent in the sport of rock climbing and
can occur at anytime, regardless of the negligence of the Regents. 161
The case above is an example of why courts need to look at a sport's
inherent risks, and whether the defendant negligently increased those
risks, before denying liability. If the abovementioned court had con-
sidered these factors, it is possible that the family of the student that
died as a result of his fall could have recovered for the pain and suffer-
ing that they had to endure. Throughout this article, the argument has
been that sponsors of an event should be liable for those negligent
actions that increase the inherent risks involved in a sport. However,
a standard that is fair to both the sponsor of the event and the athlete
is also necessary, which is the following section of this Article
proposes.
III. PROPOSALS
A. Inherent Risk Statutes for Extreme Sports
There are already sport safety statutes that have been implemented
in various states to determine what the inherent risks are in certain
sports. 162 Similar statutes should be created for extreme sports. Each
sport that is classified as an extreme sport should have a statute that
unambiguously states what the inherent risks are. The statutes should
also be implemented in all states where these sports are executed. By
having the inherent risks stated in a statute, there should be no confu-
sion for the athletes, the sponsors, and the courts as to what those
inherent risks are. The sport specific statutes could then be imple-
mented in the liability waivers that will be used for competitions and
events. Before an athlete goes to sign the liability waiver, he or she
will be aware of each risk inherent in that specific sport. Thus, the
athlete will know exactly what risks he or she is assuming. For exam-
ple, the aforementioned IFSA contract example in the beginning of
this article stated what risks are inherent in the sport of free-skiing.
Those risks were listed as: changing weather conditions; existing and
changing snow conditions; bare spots; rocks; stumps; trees; collisions
with natural objects, man-made objects, or other skiers; variations in
terrain; and the failure of skiers to ski within their own abilities. 163
By the inclusion of clear and comprehensive lists of the inherent
risks in the liability waivers, the athlete will have a clear understand-
ing of what the sponsor can and cannot be liable for. This in turn may
161. Id.
162. See supra text accompanying Part II.A.2.
163. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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prevent the sponsor from suffering from future litigation. However,
an clear understanding of the inherent risks may also allow the athlete
to recgonize when the sponsor does something to increase those risks
already inherent in the sport. For example, being injured by man-
made objects is a risk that an athlete assumes when participating in
free-skiing events. Therefore, an athlete will be aware that by going
off a jump, he or she may fall and sustain an injury. However, if the
jump is created in a way that increases the likelihood of an injury, and
an athlete get injured as a result of the unreasonably created jump,
that athlete should be able to bring a claim against the sponsor that is
responsible for the creation of that jump. Thus, the existence of inher-
ent risk statutes will help determine when a sponsor owes a duty to an
athlete to not increase those risks inherent in a sport.
1. Opposing Arguments
Sponsors of an event may be concerned that by implementing in-
herent risk statutes, an athlete who is injured by a sponsor's negli-
gence will expect to recover his or her entire share of damages. The
argument is that once an athlete is fully informed of what the inherent
risks are, and then suffers an injury as a result of the sponsor's negli-
gence, the athlete will expect to recover full damages. Sponsors, as a
result, may implement precautionary measures that could threaten to
remove the "danger" and "thrill" that makes extreme sports so entic-
ing. However, this could be avoided by applying comparative fault to
extreme sports. Comparative fault applies when an injury has been
caused by both a defendant's breach of a legal duty to the plaintiff and
the plaintiff's voluntary decision to engage in an unusually risky
sport. 164 Application of comparative fault principles will not operate
to relieve either individual of responsibility for his or her actions, but
rather will ensure that neither party will escape such responsibility.165
Sponsors, as a result, can still provide the event without having to suf-
fer from having full liability imposed against them because the athlete,
by agreeing to participate in such a risky sport, assumes a form of
liability as well. Comparative fault can also work to maintain the
"thrill" and "danger" that is associated with extreme sports. If the
liability is going to be apportioned between the athlete and the spon-
sor, the sponsor may not feel the need to implement precautionary
measures to protect themselves from liability. Comparative fault,
therefore, helps to protect both the sponsor from full liability and the
164. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 697, 708 (Cal. 1992).
165. Id.
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athlete from being denied relief for sustaining an injury that resulted
from the sponsor's negligence.
Courts may argue that implementing inherent risk statutes will be
difficult because it will be hard to determine what the inherent risks
are in sports in which the risk of injury is already high. Courts have
held that to determine whether a given injury is within the "inherent"
risk of the sport, the determination must be based on a set of factual
conceptions of the particular sport and how it is played. 166 The indi-
viduals best situated to explain how the sport is played would be the
athletes themselves. After defining how the sport is played, athletes,
experts in the field of a particular sport, and sponsors would all be
able to provide insight as to what the inherent risks in a sport should
be. Therefore, a combined effort of the individuals involved in the
sport should be used to determine what the inherent risks are. This
combined effort among the athletes, experts, and sponsors should help
to reduce disagreements about the inherent risks once an athlete suf-
fers an injury, therefore making it easier to determine whether the
sponsor owed a duty to the athlete.
Another argument against implementing inherent risk statutes is
that the process will overburden the courts, which are already bur-
dened by the amount of issues that are on their dockets. Implement-
ing inherent risk statutes for every extreme sport will undoubtedly
require a lot of time and money. Courts may be reluctant to imple-
ment these statutes because of the time that will be required. How-
ever, theoretically, if the athletes, the experts within the field, and the
sponsors of an event help to create the statutes, there should be less of
a burden on the courts. Also, if these statutes are implemented, the
courts will not have to spend time on an inherent risk analysis because
they can just look to the statute.
Although implementing these statutes may save some time within
the court system, their implementation will be costly. However, the
majority of states that have already adopted some form of sport safety
legislation find that the cost of implementation of the statutes is ne-
gated by positive economic impact provided by the sports them-
selves. 167 The sport safety statutes also maintain a balance between
the economic health of local, state, and regional economies, and the
safety of participants. 16 8 Therefore, the benefits that will arise from
the inherent risk statutes may outweigh the costs associated with
them. The statutes, as discussed above, will eventually save the judici-
166. Staten v. Super. Ct. of Alameda Cnty., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1628, 1635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
167. Spengler, supra note 98, at 165.
168. Id.
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ary time. Also, by acknowledging what the inherent risks are for each
specific sport, the athlete and the sponsor of an event should have a
better understanding of what injuries occur as a result of one of those
inherent risks or as a result of the sponsor's negligence. This in turn
will assist the courts with their analysis of duty under the doctrine of
assumption of risk. Therefore, the advantages that inherent risk stat-
utes will create outweigh the incidental burdens associated with im-
posing the statutes.
B. An Analysis of Assumption of Risk in Extreme Sports
When courts are deciding whether an individual should be able to
recover for an injury that resulted from the defendant's negligence,
the analysis should not stop once the validity of the liability waiver has
been determined. Courts should also conduct an analysis of assump-
tion of risk in extreme sports cases to determine what the inherent
risks are in a particular sport and whether the defendant owed a duty
to the plaintiff. Assumption of risk doctrine is even more important in
extreme sports cases because the risk of injury is considerably high.
An athlete already assumes the heightened risk of sustaining an injury
without the threat of the defendant's negligence increasing the likeli-
hood of an injury. If the athlete does suffer an injury as a result of
that negligence, the defendant, for public policy reasons, should not
be able to escape liability simply because the athlete signed a liability
waiver. Therefore, even if the liability waiver is found to be valid, it is
fair to the athlete that an assumption of risk analysis be conducted.
Under assumption of risk, a plaintiff may be able to recover if the
court finds that the defendant breached the duty he or she owed to the
plaintiff by increasing the inherent risks in the sport. 169 If the defen-
dant breached this duty, comparative fault will work to apportion the
damages between the two parties.170 If the court finds that the defen-
dant did not owe a duty to the plaintiff, then primary assumption of
risk will operate as a complete defense and the plaintiff will not be
able to recover for any injuries he or she sustained.171 Without an
analysis of assumption of risk in every extreme sports case, athletes
may have to suffer an injury that was unforeseen, and therefore, was
beyond the risk that they voluntarily assumed.
169. See supra text accompanying Part II.B.
170. Id.
171. See supra text accompanying Part H.A.
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1. Opposing Arguments
Opponents of applying assumption of risk to extreme sports cite a
concern of a potential for increase in litigation and costs. The increase
in litigation will arise from athletes realizing that even though they
signed a liability waiver, they may be able to recover under assump-
tion of risk. The increased costs will arise from the courts having to
conduct an assumption of risk analysis. The question of duty is to be
determined by a court, during which the court will have to define the
risks inherent in a given sport.172 It will take time and money for the
courts to define what risks are inherent during participation of a given
sport if those risks have not already been defined. Some states have
statutes that define the inherent risks in a given sport as those that are
obvious and necessary.173 However, if such statutes are not in place, it
will take time for courts to make the determination to which risks that
are obvious and necessary. However, with the proposal that inherent
risk statutes be enacted for extreme sports, time and money could be
saved. Inherent risk statutes will already have the sport's inherent
risks listed, which would, in turn, guide the court in their factual deter-
mination regarding the risks. Therefore, conducting an assumption of
risk analysis would not be unduly burdensome for the judiciary.
C. Extreme Sports Liability Waivers Should Be Modified.
The term "negligence" should be removed from liability waivers.
As a matter of public policy, athletes should not have to agree to in-
demnify a sponsor for his or her negligence that resulted in the an
injury to the athlete. Furthermore, with the proposed implementation
of inherent risk statutes, the language in liability waivers should be
changed. The language as to liability should be changed to include
these terms:
The athlete shall understand and assume the inherent risks involved
with this sport. The inherent risks for this sport have been provided
for through the enactment of the inherent risk statute of this state. By
signing this waiver, the athlete agrees that these are risks inherent in
this sport. If the athlete subsequently sustains an injury as a result of
one of the listed inherent risks, the sponsor of the event will be im-
mune from liability. The athlete, however, does not assume risks
above and beyond those already inherent in the sport. Therefore, if
the sponsor negligently increases those inherent risks, and the athlete
sustains an injury, the athlete will not be barred from brining an action
172. Staten v. Super. Ct. of Alameda Cnty., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1628, 1633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
173. See Spengler, supra note 98.
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against the sponsor. If the athlete does bring an action, the athlete
agrees that comparative fault principles will apply to apportion the
damages between the athlete and the sponsor.
The terms above modify liability waivers to be fair not only to the
athlete but to the sponsor as well.
Modifying liability waivers to be fair to both the athlete and the
sponsor will also promote public policy. Generally, preprinted form
contracts containing releases from future damages caused by negli-
gence are not favored by the courts and have been held to be against
public policy. 17 4 However, it could also be argued that imposing all
liability on the sponsor as a result of the sponsor's negligence could be
against public policy as well because the sponsor may feel the need to
implement precautionary measures that have the effect of decreasing
the extreme nature of the sport. In order to promote public policy,
however, releases from negligence need to be removed from liability
waivers. An athlete should not have to suffer an injury as a result of
the sponsor's negligence. On the other hand, implementing compara-
tive fault in the language of liability waivers will promote public policy
with regards to sponsors because they will still be insulated from cer-
tain types of liability. Therefore, modifying liability waivers to be fair
to both parties promotes public policy.
Sponsors may argue that not being insulated from all liability will
increase litigation against them. However, that is not the case. Even
though the athlete does not assume the sponsor's negligence in the
revised liability waiver example above, the sponsor will still be im-
mune to some liability. By applying comparative fault, the fault will
be apportioned between both parties. The inherent risk statutes can
also provide a form of defense for the sponsor in the event that there
is a disagreement as to what the inherent risks are. Therefore, modi-
fying liability waivers will protect the athlete from unassuming injuries
while continuing to provide protect the sponsor from enduring full
liability.
CONCLUSION
Athletes who participate in extreme sports should not have to en-
dure injuries above those already inherent in the sport. Liability waiv-
ers that contract away a sponsor's negligence should be void as against
public policy. However, sponsors of an extreme sports event also
should not have to endure being liable for every injury that occurs. If
174. Klern v. Chaplinsky, No. CV010511065, 2002 WL 31991911, 7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 23,
2002).
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that were to happen, sponsors may implement precautionary mea-
sures that could destroy the extreme nature of the sport. The extreme
nature of the sport is often what makes the sport so appealing to the
athlete. Therefore, this article recommends a few proposals that
would maintain the extreme nature of the sport, but that would also
work to protect the athlete and the sponsor. Implementing inherent
risk statutes for each extreme sport is one such proposal that would
protect both parties. Applying an assumption of risk analysis to each
liability waiver claim is also another proposal. With these proposals,
liability waivers should be tailored in a way in which the athletes as-
sume only the risks that are inherent in the respective sport and that
do not indemnify sponsors from liability due to the sponsor's negli-
gence. Extreme sports are so different in that danger is inherent in the
sport; but athletes, even though they are consenting to the danger by
participating in the sport, still need to be protected from injuries re-
sulting from a sponsor's negligence.
